Thoughts on Homewood's LODD

The Chicago Sun Times, Chicago Tribune, and other Chicago Area parers are discussing the NIOSH report of the March 30th, 2010 fire that killed Firefighter Brian Carey and injured Firefighter Karra Kopas.
The Sun Times article.  The Chicago Tribune Article.

The Sun Times article takes a pretty harsh tone.  The Tribune Article is a little more measured in their reporting.  While NIOSH has not posted the report on their website as of this morning, the Sun Times has a copy of the report (without yet to be completed appendices).

I spent a good forty minutes reading the report and the articles from the two news outlets.  NIOSH provides a valuable service to the fire service by conducting investigations into Firefighter LODD and sharing lessons learned.  The objective is a noble one: to reduce firefighter fatalities and injuries.  The problem comes in when people start trying to read the recommendations as though they were gospel.

In the Sun Times article, John Ryan states, "Poor tactical decisions were made on how to try to extinguish the fire, including sending Carey and fellow firefighters Karra Kopas and Chris Kieta into the building with a hose that was too big to maneuver within the house."  Ryan goes on to state that, "...crew members outside the home didn't recognize signs of the deteriorating situation and order firefighters out of the building."  These conclusions are based on the "Key Recommendations" identified by NIOSH.  I do have to wonder if Mr. Ryan has ever had to make critical life and death decisions in the environment.

Situational Awareness and Fireground Tactical Decision Making  are two subjects that I take very seriously.  I've written extensivly on both issues, and teach the subjects to anyone who will host a class.   Might some elements of Situational Awareness have been lacking in the Homewood Fire?  Perhaps. 
 However, crews did perceive the advanced level of fire growth, which prompted them to pull a 2-1/2" line.  They comprehended that they had a victim in the fire building, a man whose wife had called 911 to report the fire on the front lawn saying her husband was inside.  They likely predicted that conditions were bad, and were going to get worse.  I feel comfortable saying that they likely made a Decision to try and overcome the BTU output using big water and make an aggressive Primary Search to try and determine if they could get the victim out.

Now, we come against the big "factor" in my opinion.  Should they have attempted an aggressive interior operation with a focus on the possibility of a rescue?  That's really the heart of the matter here.  All the other factors are secondary to this question: "Will we go in there?"

You of course have to make that decision any given time you pull up in front of a working fire.  We must understand the dangers present and have a fine tuned knowledge of fire behavior, building construction, and reading smoke if we are going to have the best chance of going home safe.  We need to be prepared to retreat if conditions suddenly deteriorate.  Most importantly, I believe we need to define before we ever get on the rig what level of risk we are willing to accept.  Are we willing to crawl into the building that is on fire at risk to ourselves?  Fire Chief's need to define what level of risk their department is willing to assume to accomplish the mission.   Make these things clear to your Firefighters, to your Officers, and to the citizens you serve.

Is this building, and the possible/probable life inside WORTH the risk to your self?  In the NIOSH report they highlight the concept of Victim Survivability Profiling.  It is a controversial topic, because it requires firefighters to make a decision about if a building may have likely living victims inside it.  I say it is controversial because of the conversations it has sparked in the circles of Firefighters and Officers I talk with.  I know I'm going to sit down and really gather my thoughts about Victim Survivability Profiling at some point.  In the case of the Homewood and Hazel Crest crews that pulled up that day in March they made the decision that the potential of rescuing the occupant warranted an aggressive interior operation.

Now, one of the items that Mr. Ryan latched onto as a criticism of the team, and one that NIOSH is able to address in a very sterile manner is the fact that the senior firefighter on the attack line left the building.  NIOSH identified that the firefighter had a problem with his PPE, his hood was not fully covering part of his face and he had to exit the building to fix the problem.  Where NIOSH goes with this is to effectively say that crew integrity was compromised and that this was one of the important factors that lead to the Engine crew no leaving the building before it flashed over.  Now, I was not there, but I can imagine the thought process. 

The senior firefighter, who was identified  in the Sun Times article, had a PPE problem. It happens.  He had a decision to make: 1)have the crew conducting the primary search abort and the Engine Company exit the building or 2)turn the line over to the other two firefighters on the Engine Company, make a quick exit to fix the problem, and then return to the nozzle team.  He chose to not have the entire operation stop.  He chose to do what he thought would be best for the overall fireground operation.  He exited to fix his PPE and reenter the building once he had.  I think it's a choice many people would have made.  He wasn't exiting a 30,000 square foot grocery store leaving a crew behind, he was moving twelve feet outside to fix his hood and then get back with his crew.  I think it's a choice many people reading this would have made.

I read the NIOSH report, I read the recommendations, I looked at the diagrams.  I've reached my own conclusion about why the building flashed. 

Layout of the Fire Building

If you look at the first picture of the fire building (image copyright NIOSH 2010) you will see that the Engine Crew advanced to door from the kitchen to the utility room.  This was where FF Carey was found after the hose had burnt through.

Now look at the second picture (image copyright NIOSH 2010).  The seat of the fire was in the addition on the "C" side of the building.

Conditions immediately prior to Flashover

The reason that the Flashover occured was that the Engine Crew stopped before they "Made the turn".

Making the turn is what every nozzle team has to do to put the fire out.  You have to get the water on the seat of the fire to stop the BTU production.  That requires you to push down a very hot, very dangerous hallway many times.  It inflicts punishment on the nozzle team.  Without making the turn you are simply putting water on the flame front, but you are not cooling the fire.  You can cool the ceiling as much as you want, if you don't get to the seat of the fire, it will Flashover.

In order to keep this fire from flashing over the nozzle would have to advance through the utility room and make the turn into the addition.  You have to do this with incomplete and imperfect information.  You have to do it through a difficult, dangerous environment. 

I see the NIOSH report, and more importantly Mr. Ryan's article in the Sun Times, as an attempt to make scape-goats of the Incident Commander and the Senior Firefighter.  Shame on them.  Yes, problems happened.  Anyone who has ever crawled into a burning building knows that there is no "perfect" fire.  We have to make decisions rapidly, in a life threatening environment, without perfect knowledge.  In some cases we are going to do our best and members will still get hurt, and sometimes one of our own will fall. We must learn from these incidents, not simply assign blame. 

Read the report for yourself.  Read every Line Of Duty Death report you can get your hands on.  Recognize  that you owe it to yourself, your family,and the members of your department to be prepared for the challenges of the fireground.  Be Safe.