This is a great video for SO many things. Ignore all the companies already operating and just read the conditions. I want you, as you watch it to give the following report:
"Dispatch (YOUR COMPANY i.e. Engine 1) is on the scene with a (FLOORS, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, OCCUPANCY, DIMENSIONS), (CONDITIONS), (FIRE LOCATION IF KNOWN), (YOUR ACTION), (DIRECTION OF TRAVEL)
No reading ahead! What is radio report as the first due Engine?
Okay, now, before I give you my size-up why do we care about the topics I mentioned? Let's go step by step.
YOUR COMPANY - Pretty straight forward. Radio communication should follow the "Hey YOU, It's ME" format. Get the listener's attention.
FLOORS, CONSTRUCTION, OCCUPANCY, DIMENSIONS - Paint a picture of the building. Height: How many floors gives us a sense of what laddering issues, how hard it will be to get water up top if needed, etc. Construction should be of a defined type. "Ordinary" is a construction type, "Brick" IS NOT. Construction matters because it tells the responder who can synthesize information how the fire is likely to spread. Occupancy gives us a sense of what hazards we may find. A typical single family dwelling poses different issues than a Taxpayer. Dimensions are important becasue they give a rough guess as to critical fire flow. If you give estimated dimensions rounded to the nearest 10 feet (40'x50') a good Nozzle Team (Nozzle Operator, Officer, Back-up) can figure the right GPM in their head (for 2000 square feet it's 650+GPM using the LxW/3 method).
CONDITIONS - Is there Fire, Heavy, Moderate, or Light smoke showing. Does it appear to be into the structure or is it room and contents still?
FIRE LOCATION - Where is the fire at? Smoke always points to the fire location, but watch for multiple indicators (hint, hint).
YOUR ACTION - Are you leading out, and what are you leading out with? Are you going in to investigate? All depends on the rest of the size-up but telling folks that you are leading out with 2-1/2" gives a very different sense than saying you are going in with a pre-connect.
DIRECTION OF TRAVEL - Few places do this, but unless the Truck Company pulled out of quarters with you they need to know what direction you are facing. The Truck HAS to be in an advantageous position to make use of that million dollar aerial, otherwise it's just a tool box. Leave room for the truck and let them know where to come in from. Also this lets the 2nd due companies know how to avoid blocking the way, and where to position.
Here's my size-up.
"Main, Engine 1 is on the scene with a two and a half story, balloon frame, residence, 20x40, heavy smoke showing from the attic, looks like the fire may be in the walls, we're droping the skid, we're east bound."
All key information. Let's folks know what the building is, that we may need the flow of a 2-1/2" line on each floor is this gets away from us, that I likely have an attic fire (and possible a basement fire that's in the walls), I'm leading out with a manueverable attack line, and that the Truck has to approach from the West.
It's really that simple. Really knowing your job means being able to take all that information and create (syntesize) a picture of what is likely occuring on the fireground. That's what Situational Awareness is. Being able to fully Percieve, Comprehend, and Predict what is going on with the fire and the building.
Now, I'm going to do the studying I put off for an hour. Cheer!
The Chicago Sun Times, Chicago Tribune, and other Chicago Area parers are discussing the NIOSH report of the March 30th, 2010 fire that killed Firefighter Brian Carey and injured Firefighter Karra Kopas. The Sun Times article.The Chicago Tribune Article.
The Sun Times article takes a pretty harsh tone. The Tribune Article is a little more measured in their reporting. While NIOSH has not posted the report on their website as of this morning, the Sun Times has a copy of the report (without yet to be completed appendices).
I spent a good forty minutes reading the report and the articles from the two news outlets. NIOSH provides a valuable service to the fire service by conducting investigations into Firefighter LODD and sharing lessons learned. The objective is a noble one: to reduce firefighter fatalities and injuries. The problem comes in when people start trying to read the recommendations as though they were gospel.
In the Sun Times article, John Ryan states, "Poor tactical decisions were made on how to try to extinguish the fire, including sending Carey and fellow firefighters Karra Kopas and Chris Kieta into the building with a hose that was too big to maneuver within the house." Ryan goes on to state that, "...crew members outside the home didn't recognize signs of the deteriorating situation and order firefighters out of the building." These conclusions are based on the "Key Recommendations" identified by NIOSH. I do have to wonder if Mr. Ryan has ever had to make critical life and death decisions in the environment.
Situational Awareness and Fireground Tactical Decision Making are two subjects that I take very seriously. I've written extensivly on both issues, and teach the subjects to anyone who will host a class. Might some elements of Situational Awareness have been lacking in the Homewood Fire? Perhaps.
However, crews did perceive the advanced level of fire growth, which prompted them to pull a 2-1/2" line. They comprehended that they had a victim in the fire building, a man whose wife had called 911 to report the fire on the front lawn saying her husband was inside. They likely predicted that conditions were bad, and were going to get worse. I feel comfortable saying that they likely made a Decision to try and overcome the BTU output using big water and make an aggressive Primary Search to try and determine if they could get the victim out.
Now, we come against the big "factor" in my opinion. Should they have attempted an aggressive interior operation with a focus on the possibility of a rescue? That's really the heart of the matter here. All the other factors are secondary to this question: "Will we go in there?"
You of course have to make that decision any given time you pull up in front of a working fire. We must understand the dangers present and have a fine tuned knowledge of fire behavior, building construction, and reading smoke if we are going to have the best chance of going home safe. We need to be prepared to retreat if conditions suddenly deteriorate. Most importantly, I believe we need to define before we ever get on the rig what level of risk we are willing to accept. Are we willing to crawl into the building that is on fire at risk to ourselves? Fire Chief's need to define what level of risk their department is willing to assume to accomplish the mission. Make these things clear to your Firefighters, to your Officers, and to the citizens you serve.
Is this building, and the possible/probable life inside WORTH the risk to your self? In the NIOSH report they highlight the concept of Victim Survivability Profiling. It is a controversial topic, because it requires firefighters to make a decision about if a building may have likely living victims inside it. I say it is controversial because of the conversations it has sparked in the circles of Firefighters and Officers I talk with. I know I'm going to sit down and really gather my thoughts about Victim Survivability Profiling at some point. In the case of the Homewood and Hazel Crest crews that pulled up that day in March they made the decision that the potential of rescuing the occupant warranted an aggressive interior operation.
Now, one of the items that Mr. Ryan latched onto as a criticism of the team, and one that NIOSH is able to address in a very sterile manner is the fact that the senior firefighter on the attack line left the building. NIOSH identified that the firefighter had a problem with his PPE, his hood was not fully covering part of his face and he had to exit the building to fix the problem. Where NIOSH goes with this is to effectively say that crew integrity was compromised and that this was one of the important factors that lead to the Engine crew no leaving the building before it flashed over. Now, I was not there, but I can imagine the thought process.
The senior firefighter, who was identified in the Sun Times article, had a PPE problem. It happens. He had a decision to make: 1)have the crew conducting the primary search abort and the Engine Company exit the building or 2)turn the line over to the other two firefighters on the Engine Company, make a quick exit to fix the problem, and then return to the nozzle team. He chose to not have the entire operation stop. He chose to do what he thought would be best for the overall fireground operation. He exited to fix his PPE and reenter the building once he had. I think it's a choice many people would have made. He wasn't exiting a 30,000 square foot grocery store leaving a crew behind, he was moving twelve feet outside to fix his hood and then get back with his crew. I think it's a choice many people reading this would have made.
I read the NIOSH report, I read the recommendations, I looked at the diagrams. I've reached my own conclusion about why the building flashed.
Layout of the Fire Building
If you look at the first picture of the fire building (image copyright NIOSH 2010) you will see that the Engine Crew advanced to door from the kitchen to the utility room. This was where FF Carey was found after the hose had burnt through.
Now look at the second picture (image copyright NIOSH 2010). The seat of the fire was in the addition on the "C" side of the building.
Conditions immediately prior to Flashover
The reason that the Flashover occured was that the Engine Crew stopped before they "Made the turn".
Making the turn is what every nozzle team has to do to put the fire out. You have to get the water on the seat of the fire to stop the BTU production. That requires you to push down a very hot, very dangerous hallway many times. It inflicts punishment on the nozzle team. Without making the turn you are simply putting water on the flame front, but you are not cooling the fire. You can cool the ceiling as much as you want, if you don't get to the seat of the fire, it will Flashover.
In order to keep this fire from flashing over the nozzle would have to advance through the utility room and make the turn into the addition. You have to do this with incomplete and imperfect information. You have to do it through a difficult, dangerous environment.
I see the NIOSH report, and more importantly Mr. Ryan's article in the Sun Times, as an attempt to make scape-goats of the Incident Commander and the Senior Firefighter. Shame on them. Yes, problems happened. Anyone who has ever crawled into a burning building knows that there is no "perfect" fire. We have to make decisions rapidly, in a life threatening environment, without perfect knowledge. In some cases we are going to do our best and members will still get hurt, and sometimes one of our own will fall. We must learn from these incidents, not simply assign blame.
Read the report for yourself. Read every Line Of Duty Death report you can get your hands on. Recognize that you owe it to yourself, your family,and the members of your department to be prepared for the challenges of the fireground. Be Safe.
This is why we don't vent behind the Engine! By the 1:18 mark you can see that there was an Engine Company inside making what was probably a very difficult push to the seat of the fire. Even with the failed window in the fire room there was still a tremendous amount of heat in the front. Read the smoke! It's pushing out under pressure from the front of the building. This is one of those times we have to open the roof!
Most departments out there are operating at a deficit when it comes to responding manpower. There aren't enough people to go around. Regardless we have to figure out a deployment that allows us to open the building up properly. You'll see once they are outside and choose a defensive attack (any attack made from outside the building is defensive) it takes roughly :10sec of water to get a knock on the fire room that was causing the problem.
Once one interior room has flashed over the rate of heat transfer to the rest of the house skyrockets. Think of it like your oven. Until the thing heats up you can set potatoes in there bare handed all day long. Once it is 400 degrees though it gets warm just standing in front of the open door. The interior of the fire building is the same way, just that room that flashed is radiating 1500 degrees or more into the rest of the house.
Back to the embed video. About the 4:00 mark you see two guys head to the roof and then hear the saw running. We can see that the D side still has a well seated fire. At 5:02 we see a member venting the front gable window of the 1/2 story (which is probably occupied living space). There is probably the same window in the rear. These windows aren't the best for "vertical" ventilation, but they do pop the cap and start to relieve some of the pressure. They may be better than not having any kind of top side opening. The primary concern has to be not dragging the fire into unburned areas where victims may still be. However given the level of fire development there is little chance that without venting those windows anyone on the second floor would live long. We have to control the environment!
As you continue to watch the video there are some questionable choices made. Why? Lack of Situational Awareness! Do we perceive, comprehend and predict what is going on? This is one of those videos to sit down and have a shift drill with. Talk about what is going on and then how you would handle the fire if it was in your town.
As always it is easy to Monday morning quarterback someone's fire and pick out things that could have gone differently. However only by looking at these things do we have the opportunity to learn from the experiences of others. How many fires have you been to this month, or even this year? These videos, and hopefully my blog, are the mental rehearsal opportunities I keep talking about. Make the most of every fire you can watch and review. It's no different that a professional athlete watching game video! Make the most of every fire you see.
Just some thoughts and a good video. Cheers and be safe.
