This week's video blog starts us on the direction of offering a variety of TRAINING drills. Our goal here at Fire Service Warrior is to forge fire service excellence through the mastery of our knowledge, skills, and abilities across the range of Fitness, Training, and Mindfulness competencies. You can look now for our posts on those topics to have that tag. Last week Brian Brush brought us a FSWFitness Video, and this week he has a great FSWTraining video. Next week I will be hitting a FSWMindfulness topic. Enjoy the video and leave your comments below!
Please remember that these skills are meant to improve your ability to Master fundamental fireground skills which increase your capacity and ability to thrive on the fireground.
Showing posts with label Fire Attack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fire Attack. Show all posts
Monday, June 20, 2011
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Food for Thought
This is a video that has been making the rounds since it went up on You Tube. The fire occurred on June 11, 2011 and gives us room for some good discussion.
First let me say excellent work by the firefighter who was caught when the roof began collapsing. He seems to keep his head and gets himself over the ridge quickly giving his partner the critical seconds needed to get to his position to help. I also like that the members of the roof team were dressed to play and not standing on top of one another. I think if this same situation occurred with two firefighters standing in 16 square feet worth of roof the outcome would have been different.
As always there are some "do betters" in this but all in all I think the operation seems fairly well executed. A secondary means of egress was established. MOST folks seem to be wearing all their PPE. So what could have been done differently here to avoid this near miss?
There are a dozen opinions for every person who watches this video but the only thing that I would ask would be, "Did he really sound the roof?"
To be honest I did not see it in the video. Given that this appears to be an attic fire and the roof failed on the more heavily involved side of the house I think the only thing that might have made this more preventable was doing a good sounding of the roof prior to walking on it. For those who say roof ladder I hear your point, but to be honest with a roof this shallow I wouldn't automatically deploy a roof ladder.
Use this video in your next company drill. Use it as a reminder about remaining calm when things go wrong. Use it to remind your folks about the importance of wearing all their PPE. Use it for size up and combat decision making skills.
First let me say excellent work by the firefighter who was caught when the roof began collapsing. He seems to keep his head and gets himself over the ridge quickly giving his partner the critical seconds needed to get to his position to help. I also like that the members of the roof team were dressed to play and not standing on top of one another. I think if this same situation occurred with two firefighters standing in 16 square feet worth of roof the outcome would have been different.
As always there are some "do betters" in this but all in all I think the operation seems fairly well executed. A secondary means of egress was established. MOST folks seem to be wearing all their PPE. So what could have been done differently here to avoid this near miss?
There are a dozen opinions for every person who watches this video but the only thing that I would ask would be, "Did he really sound the roof?"
To be honest I did not see it in the video. Given that this appears to be an attic fire and the roof failed on the more heavily involved side of the house I think the only thing that might have made this more preventable was doing a good sounding of the roof prior to walking on it. For those who say roof ladder I hear your point, but to be honest with a roof this shallow I wouldn't automatically deploy a roof ladder.
Use this video in your next company drill. Use it as a reminder about remaining calm when things go wrong. Use it to remind your folks about the importance of wearing all their PPE. Use it for size up and combat decision making skills.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Modes of Operation
I know I usually do video posts on Wednesdays, but I saw this and thought it would make a good tactical discussion. Watch the video below before moving into the rest of the piece. Pay attention to the big three of size up, Building Construction, Fire Location, Fire Development.
Given your staffing, response time, still district, etc, what mode of operations would you use to attack this fire? I bring this up because this is a fire that could go a couple of different ways.
We have four basic choices for operating modes:
Given your staffing, response time, still district, etc, what mode of operations would you use to attack this fire? I bring this up because this is a fire that could go a couple of different ways.
We have four basic choices for operating modes:
- Offensive (Enter the fire building)
- Transitional (Blitz/Quick Water attack prior to making entry)
- Defensive (Exterior attack)
- Non-Intervention (No attack)
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Tactical Thoughts - Waiting for the Engine
This is a pretty good video I found. The video starts before the apparatus arrive on scene and allows us to take note of the "Big Three" of size up: Building Construction, Fire Location, and Fire Development. Watch the video and then let's discuss.
So, what's your size up?
My inital radio report would be: Two story frame garden apartment, 200x50, fire on the top floor, looks like it's getting into the attic. Now, I can't see the whole building so I am guessing more or less at the 200, but based on what I'm seeing on the right side of the frame I am expecting that there is as much building again on the left. 50 feet may be generous on the depth, but for sure I need one length to get front to back so that's one of those "close enough for government work," sort of estimates. This maybe a lightweight building. Without having seen the building built I have to assume it may be fully or partially lightweight (Fully to me mean floors and roof system, partially means likely just the roof).
This is an interesting video because it shows us what situations can be like if we have folks respond to the scene in Personal Vehicles. You have Firefighters waiting to go to work until apparatus are there. So what can you do while you are waiting to get water?
With a partner you can ascend the interior stairs and assess conditions in the stairwell. IF the involved apartment door is closed you may be able to make a quick check on the apartment across the hall to ensure it is clear. It should be noted that is a tactic that potentially may result in you being caught off by fire if the door to the involved apartment fails. If you elect to check the apartment across the hall without a line on the fire floor do it as though it was a Vent Enter Search operation: Get the door closed to the apartment as soon as you enter to give yourself an area of safe refuge. If you are going to make that search before the Engine gets there it should be done with an experienced crew who can adequately judge conditions and who have full PPE including SCBA. Tactically that is a choice that is a very high risk evolution and the risk/benefit analysis has to be in the forefront.
Evacuating the adjoining apartments that are not served by the stairwell leading to the fire floor should be a priority. While there is likely double 5/8" drywall separating the units there is a very high likelihood of a common attic here. We can see how as the fire progresses that smoke and heat push through out the attic space toward the "D" side (the right side of the frame). We need to get up to the fire floor and get the ceiling opened immediately with the advancement of the hoseline. OPEN THE HALLWAY CEILING AND MAKE SURE THE FIRE IS NOT ABOVE YOUR HEAD ALREADY.
While I am not a huge proponent of the Transitional Attack, IF I pulled up here with a three person Engine Company (or less) and IF I made sure the door to the involved apartment was closed and IF there were no reports of a victim in the involved apartment I would consider knocking this down with a 30 second deck gun/monitor stream while the nozzle team was leading out. I think one of the problems with the transitional attack is that we end up with a lot of steam conversion and expansion that reduces the survivability of victims who may be in the path of that steam. The "pushing fire" concern is less important to me because if we are limiting ourselves to a 30 second flow of water I will not entrain much air.
All in all I think this fire was handled well. Once there was an Engine on scene water was on the fire quickly, ladders were thrown, and it seems from the angle I viewed that the situational was handled with a relative calm. Yes, I noted several folks not making full use of their PPE and I assume they were counseled by their supervisors.
So, what's your size up?
My inital radio report would be: Two story frame garden apartment, 200x50, fire on the top floor, looks like it's getting into the attic. Now, I can't see the whole building so I am guessing more or less at the 200, but based on what I'm seeing on the right side of the frame I am expecting that there is as much building again on the left. 50 feet may be generous on the depth, but for sure I need one length to get front to back so that's one of those "close enough for government work," sort of estimates. This maybe a lightweight building. Without having seen the building built I have to assume it may be fully or partially lightweight (Fully to me mean floors and roof system, partially means likely just the roof).
This is an interesting video because it shows us what situations can be like if we have folks respond to the scene in Personal Vehicles. You have Firefighters waiting to go to work until apparatus are there. So what can you do while you are waiting to get water?
With a partner you can ascend the interior stairs and assess conditions in the stairwell. IF the involved apartment door is closed you may be able to make a quick check on the apartment across the hall to ensure it is clear. It should be noted that is a tactic that potentially may result in you being caught off by fire if the door to the involved apartment fails. If you elect to check the apartment across the hall without a line on the fire floor do it as though it was a Vent Enter Search operation: Get the door closed to the apartment as soon as you enter to give yourself an area of safe refuge. If you are going to make that search before the Engine gets there it should be done with an experienced crew who can adequately judge conditions and who have full PPE including SCBA. Tactically that is a choice that is a very high risk evolution and the risk/benefit analysis has to be in the forefront.
Evacuating the adjoining apartments that are not served by the stairwell leading to the fire floor should be a priority. While there is likely double 5/8" drywall separating the units there is a very high likelihood of a common attic here. We can see how as the fire progresses that smoke and heat push through out the attic space toward the "D" side (the right side of the frame). We need to get up to the fire floor and get the ceiling opened immediately with the advancement of the hoseline. OPEN THE HALLWAY CEILING AND MAKE SURE THE FIRE IS NOT ABOVE YOUR HEAD ALREADY.
While I am not a huge proponent of the Transitional Attack, IF I pulled up here with a three person Engine Company (or less) and IF I made sure the door to the involved apartment was closed and IF there were no reports of a victim in the involved apartment I would consider knocking this down with a 30 second deck gun/monitor stream while the nozzle team was leading out. I think one of the problems with the transitional attack is that we end up with a lot of steam conversion and expansion that reduces the survivability of victims who may be in the path of that steam. The "pushing fire" concern is less important to me because if we are limiting ourselves to a 30 second flow of water I will not entrain much air.
All in all I think this fire was handled well. Once there was an Engine on scene water was on the fire quickly, ladders were thrown, and it seems from the angle I viewed that the situational was handled with a relative calm. Yes, I noted several folks not making full use of their PPE and I assume they were counseled by their supervisors.
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Tactical Thoughts
I saw this video the other day and it got me thinking.
We talk about tactics a lot in the fire service, but we fall short when it comes to talking about tactical drift. To me that is what is going on here. We get tunnel vision about putting the fire out the way we always have before, through the front door, and get impatience about standing around. So what happens? We commit firefighters to dangerous positions that they don't NEED to be in.
I think this is a great illustration of my point that often times we are lucky rather than good. Two or three fires after this when a chimney collapses and a firefighter is maimed, crippled, or killed the chorus will ring out: "But we've done this before and it was okay!"
Prolonged exposure to risk with out incident leads to a lack of appreciation of risk. In other words we get risk tunnel vision.
I accept that as a Fire Service we will aggressively commit to some very dangerous places in and above the fire area. That is what we exist to do. However we have to also recognize when we are not improving things JUST by putting people inside the building.
I am not going to belabor this post with a bunch of chatter. If we want to get serious about reducing fire fighter injuries and fatalities we need to train incident commanders, company officers, and firefighters to recognize stupid tactics and stop them. Now, to my knowledge no one got hurt at this fire, but I think we can all see the potential was there.
Just a few quick thoughts while I am plugging away at research and writing. Cheers
We talk about tactics a lot in the fire service, but we fall short when it comes to talking about tactical drift. To me that is what is going on here. We get tunnel vision about putting the fire out the way we always have before, through the front door, and get impatience about standing around. So what happens? We commit firefighters to dangerous positions that they don't NEED to be in.
I think this is a great illustration of my point that often times we are lucky rather than good. Two or three fires after this when a chimney collapses and a firefighter is maimed, crippled, or killed the chorus will ring out: "But we've done this before and it was okay!"
Prolonged exposure to risk with out incident leads to a lack of appreciation of risk. In other words we get risk tunnel vision.
I accept that as a Fire Service we will aggressively commit to some very dangerous places in and above the fire area. That is what we exist to do. However we have to also recognize when we are not improving things JUST by putting people inside the building.
I am not going to belabor this post with a bunch of chatter. If we want to get serious about reducing fire fighter injuries and fatalities we need to train incident commanders, company officers, and firefighters to recognize stupid tactics and stop them. Now, to my knowledge no one got hurt at this fire, but I think we can all see the potential was there.
Just a few quick thoughts while I am plugging away at research and writing. Cheers
Friday, April 29, 2011
You don't know, what you don't know
I'm in the middle of a heavy research cycle. I go through phases where I just let information flood in and then ruminate on it for weeks to years before the light bulb over my head turns on and I say, "Got it... here is how it all ties together." This week though a couple of things landed in my lap all at the same time. First, there was an excellent video, featuing Kathryn Schulz about the very human act of being wrong.
Then I started reading Deep Survival by Laurence Gonzales. I am still working on it but I was struck but a key point: We rarely interact with the world the way it is really occurring but with our perception of the world.
Our ability to "know" what is going on revolves around our expected mental picture of what is happening around us. We simplify exceeding complex systems to a level where we can frame them for our understanding... EVEN IF WE ARE WRONG. A fact that Gonzales comes back to over and over again is that those who find themselves in trouble (life and limb threatening events) often did not anticipate that they could find themselves in that kind of trouble. They assumed everything would be okay, or worse they planned for a minor problem and in having a contingency plan for that minor issue they assumed they could handle ANY problem. I have seen very little planning in the fire service for CATASTROPHIC failures.
Frank Brannigan said it for years, "Every sailor in the U.S. Navy is trained to abandon ship," how many of us are training on making a tactical retreat from a building? How many of us are training our folks where mid-fire attack they air horns start sounding and they have to get out Now?
I've drawn parallels to our trade and that of members of elite military units before. One of the things that makes the small unit tactics of the US Navy SEALs so effective is that their mission planning drives into dozens of "what if" scenarios for every possible contingency and failure point. They examine their options if they find themselves in contact with the enemy during insertion, if they find themselves in contact when extracting, if they lose radio contact with their support elements, if they become separated during a movement or when in contact with the enemy and dozens of other small and large failures. What this does is set up a mental model that ENCOURAGES mental AGILITY.
So, does your mission planning take into consideration all the possible failure points, or just enough minor ones to give you a false sense of confidence? Do you use SOME those hundreds of hours you spend in the fire house working out with your partner, your company, and your battalion what to do when things go wrong? It's an old military maxim that no plan survives first contact with the enemy; we need to figure out before we ever get on the Engine or Truck plans B, C, and D if we want to give our personnel the mental agility to adjust for a rapidly deteriorating situation.
Then I started reading Deep Survival by Laurence Gonzales. I am still working on it but I was struck but a key point: We rarely interact with the world the way it is really occurring but with our perception of the world.
Our ability to "know" what is going on revolves around our expected mental picture of what is happening around us. We simplify exceeding complex systems to a level where we can frame them for our understanding... EVEN IF WE ARE WRONG. A fact that Gonzales comes back to over and over again is that those who find themselves in trouble (life and limb threatening events) often did not anticipate that they could find themselves in that kind of trouble. They assumed everything would be okay, or worse they planned for a minor problem and in having a contingency plan for that minor issue they assumed they could handle ANY problem. I have seen very little planning in the fire service for CATASTROPHIC failures.
Frank Brannigan said it for years, "Every sailor in the U.S. Navy is trained to abandon ship," how many of us are training on making a tactical retreat from a building? How many of us are training our folks where mid-fire attack they air horns start sounding and they have to get out Now?
I've drawn parallels to our trade and that of members of elite military units before. One of the things that makes the small unit tactics of the US Navy SEALs so effective is that their mission planning drives into dozens of "what if" scenarios for every possible contingency and failure point. They examine their options if they find themselves in contact with the enemy during insertion, if they find themselves in contact when extracting, if they lose radio contact with their support elements, if they become separated during a movement or when in contact with the enemy and dozens of other small and large failures. What this does is set up a mental model that ENCOURAGES mental AGILITY.
So, does your mission planning take into consideration all the possible failure points, or just enough minor ones to give you a false sense of confidence? Do you use SOME those hundreds of hours you spend in the fire house working out with your partner, your company, and your battalion what to do when things go wrong? It's an old military maxim that no plan survives first contact with the enemy; we need to figure out before we ever get on the Engine or Truck plans B, C, and D if we want to give our personnel the mental agility to adjust for a rapidly deteriorating situation.
Friday, April 8, 2011
Something Doesn't Look Right Here....
Interesting Size-Up Video
I came upon this video and thought it was worth a discussion. We don't often get video of before the fire department arrives. I have a question here, and if someone sees something I don't please tell me.
I see a four story apartment building, at least 8 units, with a free burning vented fire on the first floor. There are occupied apartments on the upper floors (we can see the lights are on). I see a main entrance door in the middle of the building. One would expect that there are scissor stairs (or possibly straight run stairs if there are two apartments to a side) that run all the way up. What I don't understand is why we attack this fire from the front porch.
The responsibility of the first line is to protect the interior exposures and secure the stairwell. There very well may be occupants above this fire. Knocking it down from the front porch MAY lead to a quick darkening down, but it still neglects a major tactical point of protecting the stairs.
I'm seriously wondering if I'm missing something here, so if you see anything please chime in.
Cheers
I came upon this video and thought it was worth a discussion. We don't often get video of before the fire department arrives. I have a question here, and if someone sees something I don't please tell me.
I see a four story apartment building, at least 8 units, with a free burning vented fire on the first floor. There are occupied apartments on the upper floors (we can see the lights are on). I see a main entrance door in the middle of the building. One would expect that there are scissor stairs (or possibly straight run stairs if there are two apartments to a side) that run all the way up. What I don't understand is why we attack this fire from the front porch.
The responsibility of the first line is to protect the interior exposures and secure the stairwell. There very well may be occupants above this fire. Knocking it down from the front porch MAY lead to a quick darkening down, but it still neglects a major tactical point of protecting the stairs.
I'm seriously wondering if I'm missing something here, so if you see anything please chime in.
Cheers
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
It's Size Up Time! Again (Do it for Boo)
YouTube is an amazing resource for us. We don't get to respond to a structure fire everyday, but we sure can watch one. Look at these videos with a critical eye. Start the video and watch the first 20-30 seconds. Pause it. Close your eyes. Do a three point size-up: Building (Construction & Occupancy), Fire Location, Stage of Fire Development. I really believe that those three points can and should be accomplished by every Fire Service Warrior at every fire. Go ahead, watch the first 30 seconds and see what you come up with. No cheating. Scroll down for my size up.
One Story, Wood Frame, 40x20, single family, fire throughout with heavy fire on the B side and in the attic. This is structure burning.
Now watch the rest of the video.
What is going on? What operations are going on? What needs to be accomplished yet? If you are pulling up and assigned as RIT/FAST/RIC what tools do you want staged? Where are you setting up? What are your top three concerns. For you shift commander/Battalion level Chiefs reading what are you going to start working on to make this building behave.
One year ago today the Homewood Fire Department suffered the LODD of Brian Carey in a house not much bigger than this. Consistently we see firefighters dying in 1000 square foot or less single family dwellings. IF we can't make this building behave what chance do we have in the 27,000 square foot warehouse? Take a moment today and work on those two key skills: Fire Behavior (know the enemy) and Building Construction (know the terrain). Do it for Brian.
One Story, Wood Frame, 40x20, single family, fire throughout with heavy fire on the B side and in the attic. This is structure burning.
Now watch the rest of the video.
What is going on? What operations are going on? What needs to be accomplished yet? If you are pulling up and assigned as RIT/FAST/RIC what tools do you want staged? Where are you setting up? What are your top three concerns. For you shift commander/Battalion level Chiefs reading what are you going to start working on to make this building behave.
One year ago today the Homewood Fire Department suffered the LODD of Brian Carey in a house not much bigger than this. Consistently we see firefighters dying in 1000 square foot or less single family dwellings. IF we can't make this building behave what chance do we have in the 27,000 square foot warehouse? Take a moment today and work on those two key skills: Fire Behavior (know the enemy) and Building Construction (know the terrain). Do it for Brian.
Friday, March 11, 2011
Speaking of Culture Change
So, because of some technical difficulties I did not get to shoot a FSW Video Blog this week. Sorry, but I will be back with one next week (once my new Laptop arrives).
For today I thought I would take up the discussion of Culture Change we here so much about these days. It is the first point in the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation Life Safety Initiatives, we see blogs and articles demanding this need on a regular basis. I've said before my issue with that statement is that it is vague. It is an amorphous blob of an idea that can swallow up and tactic, technique, or procedure that people want to label as unsafe, hazardous, or inappropriate. So I'm going to ask you the read, of the two following videos, which one shows a culture we should be changing in the American (the World?) fire service.
Option 1
Option 2
You be the judge. I bet you can all guess which one I think needs changing.
For today I thought I would take up the discussion of Culture Change we here so much about these days. It is the first point in the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation Life Safety Initiatives, we see blogs and articles demanding this need on a regular basis. I've said before my issue with that statement is that it is vague. It is an amorphous blob of an idea that can swallow up and tactic, technique, or procedure that people want to label as unsafe, hazardous, or inappropriate. So I'm going to ask you the read, of the two following videos, which one shows a culture we should be changing in the American (the World?) fire service.
Option 1
Option 2
You be the judge. I bet you can all guess which one I think needs changing.
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Interesting first arriving video.
So, what's your size-up on this one? Building Construction & Occupancy, Fire Location, Fire Development, Operating Mode.
Here's mine.
"Engine 1 is on the scene with a one story frame, 50 by 25, fire in the rear, possible exposure problem on the D side. We are going into a transitional attack."
Now, I am not always a fan of transitional attacks but if we look at this scene we have obvious structural involvement, we have a lot of heat, and the attic space is charged. IF I was told there was a victim inside I might go in a different direction (like fast attack with a primary search), but we have to consider that this building is a candidate for a ventilation controlled flashover. If we make entry through the front here we have to coordinate our ventilation and HAVE TO be able to get enough water on the seat of the fire in 60 seconds. Why 60 seconds? Look at the UL study Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Construction. A compartmentalized building like this can see conditions become untenable in 70 seconds and flashover within another 30 seconds.
This is why I keep coming back to our Fireground Capacity. Capacity is our ability to provide service on the fireground. Some departments have the skills, abilities, and the manpower to execute an interior attack on a fire like this, most won't. We need to understand the capacity of our department and our companies.
As a reminder the Fire Department Instructors Conference is right around the corner. I will be presenting Situational Awareness on Monday from 1300 to 1700 in Rooms 109-110 and The Ready Position on Wednesday from 1330 to 1515 in Rooms 234-235. Please come on by, check out the programs, and introduce yourself. I plan on being at the ISFSI Event on Tuesday, the FOOLS Brotherhood Bash on Wednesday evening and will be running in the Courage & Valor run on Thursday. I look forward to seeing you there.
So, what's your size-up on this one? Building Construction & Occupancy, Fire Location, Fire Development, Operating Mode.
Here's mine.
"Engine 1 is on the scene with a one story frame, 50 by 25, fire in the rear, possible exposure problem on the D side. We are going into a transitional attack."
Now, I am not always a fan of transitional attacks but if we look at this scene we have obvious structural involvement, we have a lot of heat, and the attic space is charged. IF I was told there was a victim inside I might go in a different direction (like fast attack with a primary search), but we have to consider that this building is a candidate for a ventilation controlled flashover. If we make entry through the front here we have to coordinate our ventilation and HAVE TO be able to get enough water on the seat of the fire in 60 seconds. Why 60 seconds? Look at the UL study Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Construction. A compartmentalized building like this can see conditions become untenable in 70 seconds and flashover within another 30 seconds.
This is why I keep coming back to our Fireground Capacity. Capacity is our ability to provide service on the fireground. Some departments have the skills, abilities, and the manpower to execute an interior attack on a fire like this, most won't. We need to understand the capacity of our department and our companies.
As a reminder the Fire Department Instructors Conference is right around the corner. I will be presenting Situational Awareness on Monday from 1300 to 1700 in Rooms 109-110 and The Ready Position on Wednesday from 1330 to 1515 in Rooms 234-235. Please come on by, check out the programs, and introduce yourself. I plan on being at the ISFSI Event on Tuesday, the FOOLS Brotherhood Bash on Wednesday evening and will be running in the Courage & Valor run on Thursday. I look forward to seeing you there.
Monday, February 28, 2011
The other day I added to our "Here's Why We Search" page with some information I got about a rescue that was made in Charlotte, North Carolina. An 11 year-old boy was rescued from the second floor of his burning home by Charlotte Firefighters; his parents and older brother had escaped. Kevin Boardman did what many other 11 year-olds would have done: when he realized that the house was on fire he went back in to try and save his animals.
Companies from the CFD arrived on scene and heard that Kevin was inside. It was just before 5:30 in the morning; a family gathered on the front lawn telling the crews that their younger son was inside; the building was deteriorating rapidly. The fire was burning up the basement stairs and spreading up the stairwell. The crew of a Rescue Company committed the search the second floor while an Engine Crew dug in the protect the stairwell. Conditions were bad: visibility was close to zero; heat was banking down to the floor; the signs of rollover were present in the smoke pushing up the stairwell. The firefighters searching knew that flashover was a real possibility. The Engine crew knew that if they did not hold the fire in check for the searching members from the Rescue that things would go very badly. The efforts of these warriors resulted in Kevin being pulled from the building. He was injured, but alive. He was rushed to the hospital and then flown to a burn center.
Kevin died from his injuries. He fought for awhile: from early Thursday morning February 3rd, until the evening of Saturday the 5th Kevin (and a team of Doctors and Nurses) fought for life. He ultimately succumbed to his injuries. My thoughts are with Kevin's family.
I bring this story up to continue the debate we started back with my post "%$#@ Victim Survivability Profiling... Do Your Primary Search." Based on the criteria that Captain Marsar published in his Fire Engineering articles those crews should not have committed to the search. The smoke conditions were such that CO and HCN were present in abundance. The likelihood of a viable victim being rescued was slight based on the studies he has referenced. However, the fact remains that the brave men and women of the Charlotte Fire Department committed to a very marginal set of conditions and managed to rescue a victim. There are those who might say, "But he died," as if that were evidence that the choice to search bordered on reckless.
I will pose this question. Would you have wanted another thirty hours with your 11 year-old before he died? That's what those warriors did; they crawled into a hell that easily could have killed or maimed any of them and in doing so they gave those parents, and Kevin's older brother, the chance to see him, to say good bye. To have a memory of holding his hand one last time, not one of a sudden and surreal loss. When Kurt Vonnegut spoke of the Fire Engine and a symbol of man's humanity to man it was that kind of Courage and sense of Duty he was speaking of.
Companies from the CFD arrived on scene and heard that Kevin was inside. It was just before 5:30 in the morning; a family gathered on the front lawn telling the crews that their younger son was inside; the building was deteriorating rapidly. The fire was burning up the basement stairs and spreading up the stairwell. The crew of a Rescue Company committed the search the second floor while an Engine Crew dug in the protect the stairwell. Conditions were bad: visibility was close to zero; heat was banking down to the floor; the signs of rollover were present in the smoke pushing up the stairwell. The firefighters searching knew that flashover was a real possibility. The Engine crew knew that if they did not hold the fire in check for the searching members from the Rescue that things would go very badly. The efforts of these warriors resulted in Kevin being pulled from the building. He was injured, but alive. He was rushed to the hospital and then flown to a burn center.
Kevin died from his injuries. He fought for awhile: from early Thursday morning February 3rd, until the evening of Saturday the 5th Kevin (and a team of Doctors and Nurses) fought for life. He ultimately succumbed to his injuries. My thoughts are with Kevin's family.
I bring this story up to continue the debate we started back with my post "%$#@ Victim Survivability Profiling... Do Your Primary Search." Based on the criteria that Captain Marsar published in his Fire Engineering articles those crews should not have committed to the search. The smoke conditions were such that CO and HCN were present in abundance. The likelihood of a viable victim being rescued was slight based on the studies he has referenced. However, the fact remains that the brave men and women of the Charlotte Fire Department committed to a very marginal set of conditions and managed to rescue a victim. There are those who might say, "But he died," as if that were evidence that the choice to search bordered on reckless.
I will pose this question. Would you have wanted another thirty hours with your 11 year-old before he died? That's what those warriors did; they crawled into a hell that easily could have killed or maimed any of them and in doing so they gave those parents, and Kevin's older brother, the chance to see him, to say good bye. To have a memory of holding his hand one last time, not one of a sudden and surreal loss. When Kurt Vonnegut spoke of the Fire Engine and a symbol of man's humanity to man it was that kind of Courage and sense of Duty he was speaking of.
Monday, February 7, 2011
The Art of the Nozzle Team
I keep a copy of Tom Brennan's Random Thoughts in close proximity when I find myself with some quick reading time. For those who didn't read Fire Engineering before December of 2006 Tom Brennan (no relation), a retired FDNY Captain and former Editor-in-Chief of Fire Engineering, wrote a column that appeared just inside the back cover from January 1988 to December of 2006 called "Random Thoughts". In 2007 PennWell, the publisher of Fire Engineering, collected those column's as a book titled... Tom Brennan's Random Thoughts.
I sat down with a few minutes to spare and opened to an article Tom had written originally for the April 2004 issue of Fire Engineering. The article was titled "Safety On This Job?" and as I was reading I was struck by one point in particular. "The use of nozzles dialed to a wide pattern inside fire buildings during interior firefighting operations causes injuries. Period. Sure, they make the nozzle team really comfortable, but who said the nozzle team has a right to be comfortable?" Who said the nozzle team has a right to be comfortable? May whatever God or gods look out for warriors and small animals help me, but I love it!
I believe deep in my soul that if we can put the fire out all of our other problems go away. Putting the fire out is the job of the Nozzle Team. It isn't always easy, and it is rarely comfortable. I've talked before about the fact that the Nozzle Team MUST push through one of the most untenable places on the face of the earth when they advance down a hallway and have to Make the Turn to get water on the seat of the fire. During that push you are crawling into the belly of a dragon (figuratively... you aren't literally crawling into a dragon unless you are in The Fantasy World of Firefighting). You will have to push through heat, low or zero visibility conditions, and the immense desire to make like a sheep herder and get the flock out of there, to get water onto the seat of the fire. We know this is a difficult process, but I think those of us who do not, or have not, had to do it often forget just how challenging it can be. We aren't getting many Sets and Reps as members of a Nozzle Team unless we are on one of the handful of busy companies serving depressed, inner-city type neighborhoods. How many guys and gals actually are getting to do that?
So, what do we have to do? We have to TRAIN to thrive in that environment.
I've been developing a Hands On Training (HOT) class called "The Art of the Nozzle" for about six months now. The focus of the class is developing the skill, confidence, and competency of two and three member nozzle teams. I define the nozzle team as the firefighter with the Nozzle (the Pipe in Chicagoese), the Back-Up Firefighter (Heel), and the Officer. While staffing in cities like Chicago and New York may allow for the Door/Control position to be staffed as well, for most departments four person companies are a luxury and three person companies are the norm. With that reality our training should be focused on getting water on the fire with a two or three person team (after all someone has to be outside running the pump panel).
"The Art of the Nozzle" is a 14 hour course that gives each student nine sets of live fire evolutions. That's right, you get to crawl into a burning building... nine times. You function as the Nozzle, the Back-Up, and the Officer. You will be shown techniques for fires in dwellings at grade, above grade, and below grade. Our bread and butter fire happens in 1000 to 2000 square foot homes and this class is geared to that operating environment.
There is a good chance that you will get more quality fireground evolutions in this class than most folks get in a year or more. The best part, I think, is that we will be using helmet cams to record the evolutions and between stations you will go over the video with instructors to see what went well and what you can learn.
The pilot of the class is going to be run in this Spring and it will be available to take on the road starting this summer. Contact info@spartan-concepts.com to look into booking the class. Classes are limited to 15 students per session to maximize the Hands-On experience for each student.
If you haven't been checking out the video blogs... START. If you have, please shoot me a comment or an email and let me know what you think. Please keep referring folks to the site and make sure you stop by and Visit me at FDIC in March.
I sat down with a few minutes to spare and opened to an article Tom had written originally for the April 2004 issue of Fire Engineering. The article was titled "Safety On This Job?" and as I was reading I was struck by one point in particular. "The use of nozzles dialed to a wide pattern inside fire buildings during interior firefighting operations causes injuries. Period. Sure, they make the nozzle team really comfortable, but who said the nozzle team has a right to be comfortable?" Who said the nozzle team has a right to be comfortable? May whatever God or gods look out for warriors and small animals help me, but I love it!
I believe deep in my soul that if we can put the fire out all of our other problems go away. Putting the fire out is the job of the Nozzle Team. It isn't always easy, and it is rarely comfortable. I've talked before about the fact that the Nozzle Team MUST push through one of the most untenable places on the face of the earth when they advance down a hallway and have to Make the Turn to get water on the seat of the fire. During that push you are crawling into the belly of a dragon (figuratively... you aren't literally crawling into a dragon unless you are in The Fantasy World of Firefighting). You will have to push through heat, low or zero visibility conditions, and the immense desire to make like a sheep herder and get the flock out of there, to get water onto the seat of the fire. We know this is a difficult process, but I think those of us who do not, or have not, had to do it often forget just how challenging it can be. We aren't getting many Sets and Reps as members of a Nozzle Team unless we are on one of the handful of busy companies serving depressed, inner-city type neighborhoods. How many guys and gals actually are getting to do that?
So, what do we have to do? We have to TRAIN to thrive in that environment.
I've been developing a Hands On Training (HOT) class called "The Art of the Nozzle" for about six months now. The focus of the class is developing the skill, confidence, and competency of two and three member nozzle teams. I define the nozzle team as the firefighter with the Nozzle (the Pipe in Chicagoese), the Back-Up Firefighter (Heel), and the Officer. While staffing in cities like Chicago and New York may allow for the Door/Control position to be staffed as well, for most departments four person companies are a luxury and three person companies are the norm. With that reality our training should be focused on getting water on the fire with a two or three person team (after all someone has to be outside running the pump panel).
"The Art of the Nozzle" is a 14 hour course that gives each student nine sets of live fire evolutions. That's right, you get to crawl into a burning building... nine times. You function as the Nozzle, the Back-Up, and the Officer. You will be shown techniques for fires in dwellings at grade, above grade, and below grade. Our bread and butter fire happens in 1000 to 2000 square foot homes and this class is geared to that operating environment.
There is a good chance that you will get more quality fireground evolutions in this class than most folks get in a year or more. The best part, I think, is that we will be using helmet cams to record the evolutions and between stations you will go over the video with instructors to see what went well and what you can learn.
The pilot of the class is going to be run in this Spring and it will be available to take on the road starting this summer. Contact info@spartan-concepts.com to look into booking the class. Classes are limited to 15 students per session to maximize the Hands-On experience for each student.
If you haven't been checking out the video blogs... START. If you have, please shoot me a comment or an email and let me know what you think. Please keep referring folks to the site and make sure you stop by and Visit me at FDIC in March.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Frank Brannigan Was Wrong...
Bold words from some random guy blogging, I know but I think I am onto something here. Francis Brannigan, a Fire Protection Engineer who many of us know from his writing on building construction and his classic text Building Construction for the Fire Service, used to say, "The Building is your enemy; know your enemy!" He was wrong. The Building is the battleground, it is the terrain in which we and the enemy do battle.
Fire is the enemy and fire behavior is a predictiable indication of how the enemy will behave. If we look at line of duty death and injury statistics we see far too many of our brothers and sisters being injured or killed because of fire development. Just last week Mark Falkenhan-FF/Medic, Lutherville Volunteer Fire Company, Baltimore County FD was killed after being trapped in what sounds like flashover conditions. On Sunday a woman and three firefighters were injured at a building fire in Springfield, Virgina.
The video below show us the progression of the fireground. Dave Statter has some good comments about this over at his blog.
We can get into a debate (I suppose) about exactly what fire behavior we are seeing. It is not a backdraft. It is not a smoke explosion. This is a rapid spread of fire because of (probably) ineffective ventilation techniques. I'm not going to launch into some Tactics diatribe here because I do not know exactly what occurred at this fire. I don't know if this was a townhouse type building where the second floor was a different occupancy. I don't know if they pulled up with a two person Engine and one person on the Truck. Something different did have to occur for that fire to be vented in a way that prevented the spread of fire over the heads of the attack team.
What we can talk about is the fire progression and why the fire spread was predicable.
Look at the smoke conditions at the start of the video. This entire building is heavily charged. The structure of the building is involved. The fire is deep seated. Based on info from http://www.wunderground.com the temperature was in the low 20's(F). The somewhat "lazy" nature of the smoke once it is outside the building is due to the temperature. The key factors though should be the volume of dense smoke we see and the color. We have to recognize that if it was 65 degrees outside this smoke would push away from the building with great velocity. In this case it is "pushing" out pretty hard but then hanging more than we would normally expect from a hot fire. WHY? Because the "fluid" that is unburned products of combustion carried by heat contracts and slows when it hits that cold air.
Something worth considering is the inherent relationship between temperature and pressure.
How well do your firefighters understand Boyle's Law and Charles's law of fluid dynamics? I know, I know, that's HazMat... right? Maybe I'm biased to looking at this through a lens of Chemical and Physical properties because I just got back from a validating committee for a HazMat Technician Text Book.
Charles's Law simple says that as temperature increases so does pressure in a closed container. Boyle's Law tells us that if you keep temperatue constant as pressure doubles volume halves/ as volume doubles pressure is halved. In other words if you give a fluid more space the pressure is lessened, if you give it less space pressure increases. Here is where they come together. As temperature is building because of unrestrained fire the pressure in the building begins to increase. If the building was perfectly sealed that increase in pressure would eventually smother the fire by consuming oxygen. If it cools off the fire goes out and all the unburnned products of combustion just congeal on surfaces.
However, once we allow the building to ventilate (in any manner) we create a place for that "fluid" to go. However because it is a small opening relative to the amount of product temperature and pressure continue to build. The exiting "fluid" is heated but to rich to burn (I know, more HazMat).
At the 1:45 mark you can see flame in the C/D corner window on the D side (if you call the front door side of the building where the truck is parked A). In 15 seconds heavy fire is venting out the window. 30 seconds after the flame is viable we can see through the A/D corner window the fire is extending. Three seconds later (2:14) the unburned fuel that is exiting the front lights up. Once it lights up you will notice that the smoke is moving a lot faster up and away. That's because the heat is now outside and overcoming the slowing/contracting effect of the ambient temperature.
We MUST study these fires and understand what is happening in the building. I was in Tulsa over the weekend and spent a few minutes talking with Ed Hartin who teaches extensively about Compartment Fire Behavior Training Ed is a Fire Behavior guy. We talked about how it is the lack of knowledge about Fire Behavior that is getting us hurt and killed on the fireground. While fire behavior may not be predictable with 100% accuracy I venture to say if you are a student of this trade we can get close to 95%. We don't know until we are inside the compartment what effect the layout may have on fire growth and spread. However we should understand intuitively what the smoke conditions are telling us about the growth, stage, and location of the fire.
The building is the battleground, and warriors going back as far as Sun Tzu have taught us how important it is to understand the terrain. The ENEMY though is the fire. You can know all you want about the terrain but if you do not know what the ENEMY is going to do you will still end up killed. The Fire is Your Enemy, Know You Enemy; The Building is the Battleground, Know the Terrain.
Fire is the enemy and fire behavior is a predictiable indication of how the enemy will behave. If we look at line of duty death and injury statistics we see far too many of our brothers and sisters being injured or killed because of fire development. Just last week Mark Falkenhan-FF/Medic, Lutherville Volunteer Fire Company, Baltimore County FD was killed after being trapped in what sounds like flashover conditions. On Sunday a woman and three firefighters were injured at a building fire in Springfield, Virgina.
The video below show us the progression of the fireground. Dave Statter has some good comments about this over at his blog.
We can get into a debate (I suppose) about exactly what fire behavior we are seeing. It is not a backdraft. It is not a smoke explosion. This is a rapid spread of fire because of (probably) ineffective ventilation techniques. I'm not going to launch into some Tactics diatribe here because I do not know exactly what occurred at this fire. I don't know if this was a townhouse type building where the second floor was a different occupancy. I don't know if they pulled up with a two person Engine and one person on the Truck. Something different did have to occur for that fire to be vented in a way that prevented the spread of fire over the heads of the attack team.
What we can talk about is the fire progression and why the fire spread was predicable.
Look at the smoke conditions at the start of the video. This entire building is heavily charged. The structure of the building is involved. The fire is deep seated. Based on info from http://www.wunderground.com the temperature was in the low 20's(F). The somewhat "lazy" nature of the smoke once it is outside the building is due to the temperature. The key factors though should be the volume of dense smoke we see and the color. We have to recognize that if it was 65 degrees outside this smoke would push away from the building with great velocity. In this case it is "pushing" out pretty hard but then hanging more than we would normally expect from a hot fire. WHY? Because the "fluid" that is unburned products of combustion carried by heat contracts and slows when it hits that cold air.
Something worth considering is the inherent relationship between temperature and pressure.
How well do your firefighters understand Boyle's Law and Charles's law of fluid dynamics? I know, I know, that's HazMat... right? Maybe I'm biased to looking at this through a lens of Chemical and Physical properties because I just got back from a validating committee for a HazMat Technician Text Book.
Charles's Law simple says that as temperature increases so does pressure in a closed container. Boyle's Law tells us that if you keep temperatue constant as pressure doubles volume halves/ as volume doubles pressure is halved. In other words if you give a fluid more space the pressure is lessened, if you give it less space pressure increases. Here is where they come together. As temperature is building because of unrestrained fire the pressure in the building begins to increase. If the building was perfectly sealed that increase in pressure would eventually smother the fire by consuming oxygen. If it cools off the fire goes out and all the unburnned products of combustion just congeal on surfaces.
However, once we allow the building to ventilate (in any manner) we create a place for that "fluid" to go. However because it is a small opening relative to the amount of product temperature and pressure continue to build. The exiting "fluid" is heated but to rich to burn (I know, more HazMat).
At the 1:45 mark you can see flame in the C/D corner window on the D side (if you call the front door side of the building where the truck is parked A). In 15 seconds heavy fire is venting out the window. 30 seconds after the flame is viable we can see through the A/D corner window the fire is extending. Three seconds later (2:14) the unburned fuel that is exiting the front lights up. Once it lights up you will notice that the smoke is moving a lot faster up and away. That's because the heat is now outside and overcoming the slowing/contracting effect of the ambient temperature.
We MUST study these fires and understand what is happening in the building. I was in Tulsa over the weekend and spent a few minutes talking with Ed Hartin who teaches extensively about Compartment Fire Behavior Training Ed is a Fire Behavior guy. We talked about how it is the lack of knowledge about Fire Behavior that is getting us hurt and killed on the fireground. While fire behavior may not be predictable with 100% accuracy I venture to say if you are a student of this trade we can get close to 95%. We don't know until we are inside the compartment what effect the layout may have on fire growth and spread. However we should understand intuitively what the smoke conditions are telling us about the growth, stage, and location of the fire.
The building is the battleground, and warriors going back as far as Sun Tzu have taught us how important it is to understand the terrain. The ENEMY though is the fire. You can know all you want about the terrain but if you do not know what the ENEMY is going to do you will still end up killed. The Fire is Your Enemy, Know You Enemy; The Building is the Battleground, Know the Terrain.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Succeeding In Spite of Our Selves...
I think there are days that as firefighters we end up succeeding in spite of our best efforts to get killed. There are folks who drive too fast, refuse to wear seat belts, think a healthy lunch is ordered off the McDonald's Value Menu, and whose exercise regime consists of shuffling to the pop machine on the apparatus floor during commercials. I'm pretty sure at this point anyone who is regularly reading this blog knows that that kind of behavior will cause you to meet an early death.
What scares me are tactical errors that we make that by shear luck work out okay. There is a maxim I've read from the fine folks over at Magpul Industries (click on their Mindset tab for some great quotes), "Familiarity and prolonged exposure without incident leads to a loss of appreciation of risk."
Watch this video to see what I'm talking about. It's a fire from the 13th of January, 2011. By all rights it could have become a NIOSH report in my opinion.
I dislike being a "Monday Morning Quarterback" of a fire department's actions if I wasn't at the fire, but this video scares me. There are issues with opposing lines, a PPV operation that I think spreads the fire, and committing to an interior operation with what looks like too few resources.
Look at the smoke conditions on the "A" side. That front eve is highly pressurized, and that was before the PPV went into operation. That is a sure sign that the attic is well involved. Fire burning above me concerns me. If you go to the YouTube video and read the comments the video's author says they had problems with water supply.
I think if we want to be serious about reducing firefighter injuries and LODDs we have to acknowledge that our ability to operate in a relatively safe way on the fireground has a direct coloration to our staffing. That was the key point in my article "Why We Need Firefighters" that Fire Engineering featured on their website.
I know there are people who see my writing and my ideas as advocating an overly-aggressive mindset. I really don't think that is the case. This is one of those fires where I think we needed more people on scene to make the building behave. Again, I was not there, and I can only judge based upon what the video shows. I have to say that I spent the six minutes and forty odd seconds waiting for a collapse.
Consider the last fire you had where Everyone Went Home but it was only because of the grace of whatever divine creator is looking down on you that you did. We all have those stories where things could have broken bad at any moment. Learn from the fires where things "went right" as well as the one's where things went wrong. My buddy Dave LeBlanc talks about this some in his post "From Sir Lancelot To Wyatt Earp to Dick Winters, Putting Others Ahead Of Ourselves".
I'm glad everyone from the Lafayette County Fire Department went home. Believe me I'm not criticizing the guys and gals who put the fire out. I think this is one that needs to be learned from and not repeated with that "loss of appreciation of risk." This is a fire where something could have broken bad. While I think we sometimes have to place our toes over the edge to fulfill out duty it cannot be allowed to happen without careful thought, discussion, and post fire analysis.
On another note, take some time to look into what's happening in Camden New Jersey today, too. Tomorrow, January 18th, 1/3 of their Firefighters are due to be laid off. Thoughts are with the Brothers and Sisters there.
What scares me are tactical errors that we make that by shear luck work out okay. There is a maxim I've read from the fine folks over at Magpul Industries (click on their Mindset tab for some great quotes), "Familiarity and prolonged exposure without incident leads to a loss of appreciation of risk."
Watch this video to see what I'm talking about. It's a fire from the 13th of January, 2011. By all rights it could have become a NIOSH report in my opinion.
I dislike being a "Monday Morning Quarterback" of a fire department's actions if I wasn't at the fire, but this video scares me. There are issues with opposing lines, a PPV operation that I think spreads the fire, and committing to an interior operation with what looks like too few resources.
Look at the smoke conditions on the "A" side. That front eve is highly pressurized, and that was before the PPV went into operation. That is a sure sign that the attic is well involved. Fire burning above me concerns me. If you go to the YouTube video and read the comments the video's author says they had problems with water supply.
I think if we want to be serious about reducing firefighter injuries and LODDs we have to acknowledge that our ability to operate in a relatively safe way on the fireground has a direct coloration to our staffing. That was the key point in my article "Why We Need Firefighters" that Fire Engineering featured on their website.
I know there are people who see my writing and my ideas as advocating an overly-aggressive mindset. I really don't think that is the case. This is one of those fires where I think we needed more people on scene to make the building behave. Again, I was not there, and I can only judge based upon what the video shows. I have to say that I spent the six minutes and forty odd seconds waiting for a collapse.
Consider the last fire you had where Everyone Went Home but it was only because of the grace of whatever divine creator is looking down on you that you did. We all have those stories where things could have broken bad at any moment. Learn from the fires where things "went right" as well as the one's where things went wrong. My buddy Dave LeBlanc talks about this some in his post "From Sir Lancelot To Wyatt Earp to Dick Winters, Putting Others Ahead Of Ourselves".
I'm glad everyone from the Lafayette County Fire Department went home. Believe me I'm not criticizing the guys and gals who put the fire out. I think this is one that needs to be learned from and not repeated with that "loss of appreciation of risk." This is a fire where something could have broken bad. While I think we sometimes have to place our toes over the edge to fulfill out duty it cannot be allowed to happen without careful thought, discussion, and post fire analysis.
On another note, take some time to look into what's happening in Camden New Jersey today, too. Tomorrow, January 18th, 1/3 of their Firefighters are due to be laid off. Thoughts are with the Brothers and Sisters there.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Nope, Venting There Isn't Helping.
This is the video I was talking about earlier. There is a TON of great things to talk about in this video, but I'm going to restrict my comments to a few areas. 1) Conditions at the start; 2)The statements about the roof (1:25); 3) the Venting of Division A (4:05 mark)
Okay, this is a prime example of smoke conditions telling you that you are losing at the get-go. The smoke is pushing out of here in a violent manner. Dave Dodson talks about Velocity, Volume, and Density. THEY ARE ALL HERE! This thing is structural and ready to flash. Then we get to the commentary about the Roof being unstable. There is a rule I learned at 15 years-old when I started hanging out in firehouses, "If you can't be on it, you shouldn't be under it." In other words, if the roof is too unstable for vertical ventilation then it isn't safe to be underneath. After all, when was the last time you saw a rood collapse upwards? Next let's look at what happens at the 4:05 mark when the Division A window gets vented. The front room finally gets enough good air to light up. Watch how the fire quickly extends to the smoke over the heads of the members on the front porch. Smoke is FUEL!
As always I am not criticizing the actions of anyone on the scene. I don't know what orders were given, only what I see in the video. Just throw this one up at roll-call and get some conversation going.
Okay, this is a prime example of smoke conditions telling you that you are losing at the get-go. The smoke is pushing out of here in a violent manner. Dave Dodson talks about Velocity, Volume, and Density. THEY ARE ALL HERE! This thing is structural and ready to flash. Then we get to the commentary about the Roof being unstable. There is a rule I learned at 15 years-old when I started hanging out in firehouses, "If you can't be on it, you shouldn't be under it." In other words, if the roof is too unstable for vertical ventilation then it isn't safe to be underneath. After all, when was the last time you saw a rood collapse upwards? Next let's look at what happens at the 4:05 mark when the Division A window gets vented. The front room finally gets enough good air to light up. Watch how the fire quickly extends to the smoke over the heads of the members on the front porch. Smoke is FUEL!
As always I am not criticizing the actions of anyone on the scene. I don't know what orders were given, only what I see in the video. Just throw this one up at roll-call and get some conversation going.
Thursday, December 9, 2010
It's Size Up Time!
This is a great video for SO many things. Ignore all the companies already operating and just read the conditions. I want you, as you watch it to give the following report:
"Dispatch (YOUR COMPANY i.e. Engine 1) is on the scene with a (FLOORS, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, OCCUPANCY, DIMENSIONS), (CONDITIONS), (FIRE LOCATION IF KNOWN), (YOUR ACTION), (DIRECTION OF TRAVEL)
No reading ahead! What is radio report as the first due Engine?
Okay, now, before I give you my size-up why do we care about the topics I mentioned? Let's go step by step.
Here's my size-up.
"Main, Engine 1 is on the scene with a two and a half story, balloon frame, residence, 20x40, heavy smoke showing from the attic, looks like the fire may be in the walls, we're droping the skid, we're east bound."
All key information. Let's folks know what the building is, that we may need the flow of a 2-1/2" line on each floor is this gets away from us, that I likely have an attic fire (and possible a basement fire that's in the walls), I'm leading out with a manueverable attack line, and that the Truck has to approach from the West.
It's really that simple. Really knowing your job means being able to take all that information and create (syntesize) a picture of what is likely occuring on the fireground. That's what Situational Awareness is. Being able to fully Percieve, Comprehend, and Predict what is going on with the fire and the building.
Now, I'm going to do the studying I put off for an hour. Cheer!
"Dispatch (YOUR COMPANY i.e. Engine 1) is on the scene with a (FLOORS, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, OCCUPANCY, DIMENSIONS), (CONDITIONS), (FIRE LOCATION IF KNOWN), (YOUR ACTION), (DIRECTION OF TRAVEL)
No reading ahead! What is radio report as the first due Engine?
Okay, now, before I give you my size-up why do we care about the topics I mentioned? Let's go step by step.
- YOUR COMPANY - Pretty straight forward. Radio communication should follow the "Hey YOU, It's ME" format. Get the listener's attention.
- FLOORS, CONSTRUCTION, OCCUPANCY, DIMENSIONS - Paint a picture of the building. Height: How many floors gives us a sense of what laddering issues, how hard it will be to get water up top if needed, etc. Construction should be of a defined type. "Ordinary" is a construction type, "Brick" IS NOT. Construction matters because it tells the responder who can synthesize information how the fire is likely to spread. Occupancy gives us a sense of what hazards we may find. A typical single family dwelling poses different issues than a Taxpayer. Dimensions are important becasue they give a rough guess as to critical fire flow. If you give estimated dimensions rounded to the nearest 10 feet (40'x50') a good Nozzle Team (Nozzle Operator, Officer, Back-up) can figure the right GPM in their head (for 2000 square feet it's 650+GPM using the LxW/3 method).
- CONDITIONS - Is there Fire, Heavy, Moderate, or Light smoke showing. Does it appear to be into the structure or is it room and contents still?
- FIRE LOCATION - Where is the fire at? Smoke always points to the fire location, but watch for multiple indicators (hint, hint).
- YOUR ACTION - Are you leading out, and what are you leading out with? Are you going in to investigate? All depends on the rest of the size-up but telling folks that you are leading out with 2-1/2" gives a very different sense than saying you are going in with a pre-connect.
- DIRECTION OF TRAVEL - Few places do this, but unless the Truck Company pulled out of quarters with you they need to know what direction you are facing. The Truck HAS to be in an advantageous position to make use of that million dollar aerial, otherwise it's just a tool box. Leave room for the truck and let them know where to come in from. Also this lets the 2nd due companies know how to avoid blocking the way, and where to position.
Here's my size-up.
"Main, Engine 1 is on the scene with a two and a half story, balloon frame, residence, 20x40, heavy smoke showing from the attic, looks like the fire may be in the walls, we're droping the skid, we're east bound."
All key information. Let's folks know what the building is, that we may need the flow of a 2-1/2" line on each floor is this gets away from us, that I likely have an attic fire (and possible a basement fire that's in the walls), I'm leading out with a manueverable attack line, and that the Truck has to approach from the West.
It's really that simple. Really knowing your job means being able to take all that information and create (syntesize) a picture of what is likely occuring on the fireground. That's what Situational Awareness is. Being able to fully Percieve, Comprehend, and Predict what is going on with the fire and the building.
Now, I'm going to do the studying I put off for an hour. Cheer!
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
What do you mean there's no shouting!?!
Far too often when I watch videos of fires there is a veritable ton of screaming and yelling going on. Here is a video out of FDNY where there isn't.
There is no yelling. There is no screaming. Still, the job is getting done!
Based on the info this was a 2nd alarm fire. We can see that the First and Second due Companies are already at work. The main is to the roof, and two lines have gone in the front door. The Rapid Intervention Crew is staged in the front of the building with their tools and packed up ready to go. The Engine Company that is stretching looks to be advancing a third line into the fire. The Firefighter with the nozzle takes the working length, each successive member has a length of hose to advance. No screaming, "Give me more line!" They just lead out.
For you Engine guys do you see how the Brother with the Nozzle ascends the fire escape rather than crowd another line in the stairwell? What does he do? He gets up there and brings up his length of hose, then he gets out of the way and lets the back-up firefighter pull up the next length and so on.
It's a big building, who did the 360? That's right the Roof Team, you see one of the members get a look over the side at about the :40 second mark. If command cannot make a 360 because of the size/complexity of the building, or because of that dreaded SOG of Immobility that forces the IC to sit in the front seat of the buggy, then someone has to get the rear. It may not be possible (or good tactics) for the officer of the first Engine to do it. What has to be known is WHO is going to do it.
Why does this work so smoothly in the video? Of course there are the choruses of "Because it's FDNY!" They do a really good job most days, no doubt. The real reasons it works there is because 1) they have defined expected actions and priorities in their SOGs: the Nozzle Firefighter of the 1st Engine knows what to do, and what EVERYONE else on that first alarm will do and 2) there are enough people! If you try and streach a line 300' down the block and up a fire escape and into a fire floor with two people, guess what, YOU WILL START SCREAMING!!!! Why? Because you do not have enough people to do the job smoothly. You will get hung up on obstacles, you will have to fight the hose... it's inevitable. The lesson is know how many brothers and sisters it takes to make those lead-outs happen. Define who is responsible for which Fireground Operational Priorities. Have riding positions and tool assignments that are filled by required functions is a well developed manner. In other words: Do Your Job and Do Your Best.
There is no yelling. There is no screaming. Still, the job is getting done!
Based on the info this was a 2nd alarm fire. We can see that the First and Second due Companies are already at work. The main is to the roof, and two lines have gone in the front door. The Rapid Intervention Crew is staged in the front of the building with their tools and packed up ready to go. The Engine Company that is stretching looks to be advancing a third line into the fire. The Firefighter with the nozzle takes the working length, each successive member has a length of hose to advance. No screaming, "Give me more line!" They just lead out.
For you Engine guys do you see how the Brother with the Nozzle ascends the fire escape rather than crowd another line in the stairwell? What does he do? He gets up there and brings up his length of hose, then he gets out of the way and lets the back-up firefighter pull up the next length and so on.
It's a big building, who did the 360? That's right the Roof Team, you see one of the members get a look over the side at about the :40 second mark. If command cannot make a 360 because of the size/complexity of the building, or because of that dreaded SOG of Immobility that forces the IC to sit in the front seat of the buggy, then someone has to get the rear. It may not be possible (or good tactics) for the officer of the first Engine to do it. What has to be known is WHO is going to do it.
Why does this work so smoothly in the video? Of course there are the choruses of "Because it's FDNY!" They do a really good job most days, no doubt. The real reasons it works there is because 1) they have defined expected actions and priorities in their SOGs: the Nozzle Firefighter of the 1st Engine knows what to do, and what EVERYONE else on that first alarm will do and 2) there are enough people! If you try and streach a line 300' down the block and up a fire escape and into a fire floor with two people, guess what, YOU WILL START SCREAMING!!!! Why? Because you do not have enough people to do the job smoothly. You will get hung up on obstacles, you will have to fight the hose... it's inevitable. The lesson is know how many brothers and sisters it takes to make those lead-outs happen. Define who is responsible for which Fireground Operational Priorities. Have riding positions and tool assignments that are filled by required functions is a well developed manner. In other words: Do Your Job and Do Your Best.
Saturday, December 4, 2010
More Fire Video & Updates
Well we have a new title for the book. In March at FDIC you will be able to buy your copy of The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness. The new title will hopefully give people a better sense of what the book is before they pick it up. It's not surprising, but people do judge a book by it's cover.
I came across the video below today. This is a pretty good first line attack.
My only major complaint might be the Driver speeding up with the two vehicles in the way. I like the officer (I assume) telling the driver to pull forward to leave room for the Truck. It takes about 2 minutes from arrival before we start to see some steam conversion. All in all a good attack. Not knowing the still area my only concern based on the three sided view we see on arrival is IF this is a lightweight roof assembly we may have rapid truss failure... there is fire in the attack. We get a ladder thrown for secondary egress (the angle is a little steep but at least it's there). All in all this is a good fire attack.
Enjoy the snow this weekend.
I came across the video below today. This is a pretty good first line attack.
My only major complaint might be the Driver speeding up with the two vehicles in the way. I like the officer (I assume) telling the driver to pull forward to leave room for the Truck. It takes about 2 minutes from arrival before we start to see some steam conversion. All in all a good attack. Not knowing the still area my only concern based on the three sided view we see on arrival is IF this is a lightweight roof assembly we may have rapid truss failure... there is fire in the attack. We get a ladder thrown for secondary egress (the angle is a little steep but at least it's there). All in all this is a good fire attack.
Enjoy the snow this weekend.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
The Exception to the Rule
I have said and written here that you should not vent behind the Engine, because you will pull the fire on top of them. That rule is 99.9% effective in preventing injuries to our Brother and Sister Fire Service Warriors. Of course every rule has it's exceptions. Take the video below.
November 17, 2010 Newark, NJ
So the front door is open, the line is ready to enter and then some Truck guy pops the front window. Come on man! Right?
If you notice the picture window was already open, the Truck popped the side window which gives the Brother with the nozzle a chance to darken down the fire venting from the window reducing the chance of it wrapping around behind them. Then the Engine makes their push into the building. At the :17second mark we can see into the fire room, which is the living room just to the left of the front door. Dollars to doughnuts the stairs are right in front of the Engine as the lead in. I'm going to assume that when the Team gained entry to the front door they saw the fire was in the living room. Rather than lead out to the rear (which would take time to go down and back) they quickly enter the front, get the line between the fire and and potential victims on the second floor and have a vent opening (the front window) to get the bulk of the products of combustion out. Outstanding Job!
The only complaint I have is the Engine position right in front restricting the options for the Truck. Remember Hose Stretches, Ladders Don't!
Take this one and sit down with your crew for a quick drill one day. What are do your SOG's say about making this attack?
November 17, 2010 Newark, NJ
So the front door is open, the line is ready to enter and then some Truck guy pops the front window. Come on man! Right?
If you notice the picture window was already open, the Truck popped the side window which gives the Brother with the nozzle a chance to darken down the fire venting from the window reducing the chance of it wrapping around behind them. Then the Engine makes their push into the building. At the :17second mark we can see into the fire room, which is the living room just to the left of the front door. Dollars to doughnuts the stairs are right in front of the Engine as the lead in. I'm going to assume that when the Team gained entry to the front door they saw the fire was in the living room. Rather than lead out to the rear (which would take time to go down and back) they quickly enter the front, get the line between the fire and and potential victims on the second floor and have a vent opening (the front window) to get the bulk of the products of combustion out. Outstanding Job!
The only complaint I have is the Engine position right in front restricting the options for the Truck. Remember Hose Stretches, Ladders Don't!
Take this one and sit down with your crew for a quick drill one day. What are do your SOG's say about making this attack?
Monday, November 29, 2010
Ventilation - What not to Do.
Great video to illustrate exactly how ventilation effects fire spread. Pay attention from about the 3 minute 27second mark.
On YouTube this is titled "Fire Fighter Freelanced Ventilation". I don't know if this was freelancing, was an ordered act, or a case of lack of knowledge of fire behavior married with a SOG that encourages implicit coordination. What is clear is that we can see EXACTLY how ventilation works. When you open up, the smoke and trapped heat flow out the opening. If that is not channeling the superheated products of combustion out of the building in a controlled manner then we are going to spread the fire.
Take the time to study these videos when you find them. We only get to see a very small number of fires during the course of our operations. These videos are a good way for us to watch, replay, study and learn.
On YouTube this is titled "Fire Fighter Freelanced Ventilation". I don't know if this was freelancing, was an ordered act, or a case of lack of knowledge of fire behavior married with a SOG that encourages implicit coordination. What is clear is that we can see EXACTLY how ventilation works. When you open up, the smoke and trapped heat flow out the opening. If that is not channeling the superheated products of combustion out of the building in a controlled manner then we are going to spread the fire.
Take the time to study these videos when you find them. We only get to see a very small number of fires during the course of our operations. These videos are a good way for us to watch, replay, study and learn.
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